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Alhajji thesis: US intended Hormuz closed as China energy-dominance statecraft

Notes

Alhajji thesis: US intended Hormuz closed as China energy-dominance statecraft

Contested single-source hypothesis (JOURNALISTIC_STANDARDS A, C, E, I). anas-alhajji (Energy Outlook Advisors) on Macro Voices #541 (July 16, 2026) holds the non-consensus view that the United States deliberately closed the Strait of Hormuz — via the insurance-withdrawal channel, not a mining campaign — to signal energy/AI dominance to China, and that the nuclear story was cover. He is an oil economist selling a research product; he talks LNG/coal names in the same interview. This page records the thesis. It does not adopt it. The separable, more checkable claim — insurers, not navies, were the transmission — lives on war-risk-insurance-as-chokepoint-transmission. Cite the mechanism, not the motive, until a primary document (NSS text, administration statement, underwriter filing) independently supports intent.

One-line summary: Alhajji argues first-term Trump "energy independence" became second-term "energy dominance" (energy + AI/semiconductors, i.e. Taiwan/Asia), that the November NSS discussed "keeping Hormuz open" months before the closure, that Western media mistook a small-city council rant for Iranian policy, and that Iran "claimed they closed the strait after the insurance companies closed it." He says execution went bad because IRGC hardliners are not the negotiating team and now prevent a cheap reopen. Default after MoU failure is skirmishes, not a return to March–April full-scale war.

The thesis (attributed)

  • anas-alhajji in 2026-07-16-podcast-macro-voices-macrovoices-541-dr-anas-alhajji-bab-el-mandeb-the, on the independence→dominance shift: first Trump term "energy independence"; return to office "the talk is about energy dominance" including "dominance in the world through energy and AI" and semiconductors from Asia/Taiwan.
  • Same, on NSS as tell: "read the national security strategy that being released by the Trump administration in November, which outlines most of the points that I mentioned. And they also talk about there was a statement that's very striking statement about keeping Strait of Hormuz open. And the Strait of Hormuz never been closed. They always talk about freedom of navigation. Why this time they are talking about keeping the Strait of Hormuz open before, three months before they closed it."
  • Same, on "deep state" authorship: "whatever these strategies are, this comes from the deep state. It does not come directly from the Trump administration. Which means that even if we have a different administration, we would have seen similar approaches." Framing, not a finding. Do not promote.
  • Same, on media misfire: Western outlets treated a small-city council member "angry because of the 12 Day War" calling on his government to close Hormuz as "an Iranian official basically calling to close" it.
  • Same, gangster-at-the-mall metaphor: Iran "claimed that they closed the Hormuz Strait after the insurance companies closed it." He still holds "Iran cannot close the Hormuz Strait" militarily.
  • Host eric-townsend restates (and Alhajji does not walk back): "the Strait of Horm was intentionally closed by the United States for the purpose of... statecraft. With China."

What went wrong, in his account

  • Execution "went bad." US expected a cheap reopen; IRGC hardliners "benefited greatly from the sanctions" and "want this to last longer."
  • Iranian government/negotiators "have no choice but to make statements against the Trump administration" for domestic/IRGC consumption; Trump "outrageous statements for domestic consumption." "We should not be fooled by those statements" into pricing a return to full war.
  • Default after MoU failure: full-scale war (March–April type) has "very small" probability; recent weeks are "skirmishes."
  • anas-alhajji in same, on energy-dominance policy design: "whoever crafted this policy, they focused on upstream and they forgot the downstream" — US refining at 96–97% so dominance without distillate capacity is incomplete. Attach to donald-trump as attributed policy critique, not a finding.

Relation to the existing Iran-war page

iran-war-2025-2026 and operation-epic-fury treat Hormuz disruption as a consequence of US/Israeli strikes and a dual blockade Iran calls an "act of war." Alhajji inverts agency: insurers closed it; the US wanted that outcome as a China signal; Iran claimed credit after the fact. Both framings now sit in the wiki. Disagreement is a research prompt (NSS November text; EU solvency rule; underwriter notices; Iranian vs US readouts), not a tie-breaker.

What would move conviction

  • The November NSS passage on Hormuz, quoted not paraphrased
  • A named EU solvency instrument with a 7-day war-risk cancellation clause
  • Underwriter notices from the closure window
  • An administration primary that energy-dominance vis-à-vis China was a war aim

Until then: hypothesis, low conviction, single source.

Related

Referenced by
Concepts
Iran War (2025–2026)War-risk insurance is the chokepoint transmission mechanism, not military force
Questions
Does a Bab el-Mandeb tanker attack trigger insurance withdrawal → a ~4 Mbbl/d Saudi export halt → oil above $100?
Entities
Anas AlhajjiDonald Trump