Montgomery removes the broker's preemption shield → carrier vetting becomes an insurable liability → the long tail of small carriers loses its freight source → capacity bifurcates by safety rating

**One-line chain.** A unanimous Supreme Court holding strips freight brokers of the FAAAA preemption defense against negligent-hiring claims → brokers' litigation and insurance costs reprice, and underwriters begin gating coverage on carrier-selection policy → brokers can no longer economically book the marginal low-safety-score carrier → the long tail of small carriers, which sources its freight primarily from brokers, loses its demand channel → freight capacity **bifurcates**: compliant, well-rated capacity commands a premium while non-compliant capacity exits, independent of how many drivers are licensed.

• **⚠ 2026-08-14 — HALF-FIRED, and the half that fired is the half that matters less.** CHRW Q2 FY2026 disclosed **no change in carrier mix** and **no P&L impairment** (NAST margin +280bps, AGP/load flat, 13th straight quarter of share gain) — the capacity half of this falsifier fired *against* steps 4–5. But it explicitly **did** disclose an insurance-cost change: coverage runs only through end-2026 and expense *"will likely rise"* — so the insurance half did **not** fire, it was **deferred to the 2027 renewal**. Net: the chain is not falsified, but its **near-term capacity claim is now unsupported by the one company most exposed to it**, and its whole weight rests on a cost event that has not happened yet. (From 2026-07-29-earnings-chrw-q2-fy2026.)
• **⚠ A new, cleaner falsifier this evidence suggests:** if CHRW's 2027 insurance renewal completes at ordinary market terms — i.e. broadly in line with the ~2.5% broad-commercial rate environment rather than a transportation-specific spike — step 3 is falsified outright and the chain should be closed. **That is a dated, binary test in Q4 2026 – Q1 2027.**